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Abstract  
This paper reviews arguments for government interference in the education sector and discusses 
the effectiveness of commonly used policy instruments. There are both efficiency and equity 
reasons for government intervention. Particular attention is paid to education spillovers (an 
efficiency motive). The empirical literature shows that there is little reason to argue for 
additional policy efforts to correct for externalities.  There is some promising evidence, 
however, for non-pecuniary spillovers in the form of crime reduction and health improvements. 
With regard to the effectiveness of policy instruments, the paper discusses studies with a  
(quasi-)experimental design so that the causal impact of the policy can be identified. Early 





Dit memorandum behandelt redenen voor overheidsinterventie in het onderwijs, en gaat nader 
in op de effectiviteit van de meest voorkomende beleidsinstrumenten. Er zijn zowel 
efficiëntieoverwegingen (marktfalen) als rechtvaardigheidsoverwegingen om in te grijpen in de 
onderwijsmarkt. Speciale aandacht wordt besteed aan externe effecten van onderwijs (een vorm 
van marktfalen). Uit de empirische literatuur volgt dat er weinig redenen zijn om aan te nemen 
dat extra overheidsinspanningen nodig zijn om te corrigeren voor externe effecten. 
Desalniettemin bestaat er veelbelovend bewijs voor niet-monetaire externaliteiten in de vorm 
van lagere criminaliteit en verbeteringen in de gezondheidssituatie. Met betrekking tot de 
effectiviteit van beleidsinstrumenten bespreken we studies met een (quasi-)experimentele opzet, 
zodat het causale effect van het beleidsinstrument kan worden bepaald. Voor- en vroegschoolse 
educatie blijken effectiever te zijn dan interventies in een later stadium van het onderwijs.  
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Executive summary 
 
This paper reviews arguments for government interference with education and discusses the 
effectiveness of commonly used instruments. Governments all over the world intervene 
substantially in education in terms of public support for education institutions and students and 
by means of extensive regulation of the schooling system. But are current levels of government 
interference justified, and if so, on which grounds? Spillovers from education (a source of 
market failure) and income-distributional (or equity) considerations are among the most often 
heard arguments. In this paper we review the empirical relevance of these two arguments.  
Spillovers 
Spillovers from education have been identified in the theoretical literature as an important 
source of market failures, which may drive a wedge between the social and private rate of 
return on education. The empirical literature, however, is ambiguous about the existence of 
these externalities at current levels of policy efforts. This does not implicate that education 
externalities are absent at all; current policy efforts may already have internalised the spillovers.   
Education externalities may arise in various forms. The most widely studied refer to 
externalities in production. These occur when an individual’s human capital - of which 
education is a major component - positively affects productivity and, hence, wages of others. 
Convincing evidence for this type of spillovers is lacking, though there are some indications 
that a worker’s wage and productivity are positively affected by the local average education 
level (i.e. education spillovers at the city level).  
Most promising evidence for the prevalence of spillovers from education concerns so-called 
non-pecuniary spillovers in the form of crime reduction and health improvements. These non-
pecuniary external benefits of education are not incorporated in standard estimations of the 
social return to education, which typically measure effects on GDP and not on the wider 
concept of welfare. This would imply that conventional estimates represent an underestimation 
of the true social returns to education. However, the magnitude of this downward bias is 
unclear, as we are unaware of any attempts to incorporate these non-pecuniary spillovers in an 
econometric analysis of the social returns to education.     
Equity considerations 
Another argument that governments often use to legitimate interference with education is that 
education policy may help to reduce income inequality. The argument works as follows. 
Education policies, if they succeed in raising average educational attainment (or enrolment at 
higher levels of education), make low-skilled workers scarcer, lifting their wages. At the same 
time, supply of highly educated workers increases, which leads to a reduction in their wages. 
This reduction in the skill premium would imply a reduction of wage inequality.    5 
There are several reasons to believe, however, that this equity argument does not hold in 
practice. One proposition is that a larger relative stock of skilled workers induces the 
development of new technologies that are more complementary to skilled workers. This means 
that stimulating skill formation with education policy does not only increase relative supply of 
skilled workers, but also relative demand. The hike in relative demand for skilled workers may 
be so strong that the skill premium eventually rises, such that income inequality increases rather 
than decreases.     
How effective is education policy? 
Not all government interventions in education are effective: there is always the possibility of 
government failure. This brings the question which types of interventions are effective, and at 
what stage of the education cycle governments should intervene. A particular intervention can 
be said to be effective if it leads to either higher educational attainment (i.e. educational 
quantity), or improvements in student performance (i.e. educational quality), or both.  
 
Determining the effectiveness of a particular intervention is a difficult exercise because there is 
no counterfactual, that is, we do not know what would have happened in the absence of the 
intervention. The majority of evaluations of education policies cannot determine the true causal 
effects of an intervention. This is due to the absence of rigorous methodological evaluation 
designs, that is, designs with credible control groups. Experiments with education policies, in 
which some students or schools are randomly exposed to a particular intervention (the treatment 
group), and others not (the control group), provide policymakers with valuable insights into 
which interventions are effective and which not.  
 
A review of the evaluation literature based on such controlled or natural experiments shows that 
both timing (when to intervene?) and type (how to intervene?) matter. The majority of 
interventions currently carried out appears to be directed towards raising the quality of 
education. Regarding timing, it appears that early childhood interventions are most effective, as 
they succeed in lifting both the quality and quantity of education. The evidence on interventions 
at the (post) compulsory level is mixed. Examples of promising interventions during 
compulsory schooling are additional instruction time and merit payments for teachers and 
schools. Among the interventions that do not appear to improve student performance are teacher 
testing, and introducing more computer facilities inside the classroom. Evidence is inconclusive 
for a lot of other types of interventions (e.g. policies for students at risk or class-size 
reductions), which can be attributed to differences in the setting, design, and management of 
programs.  
   6 
These findings are mostly based on evaluations of interventions carried out abroad. However, 
effects found in one program need not occur when exactly the same program is implemented in 
another country, due to differences in schooling systems or student demographics. Therefore, 
identifying effective interventions requires carrying out more experiments domestically. 
Moreover, experiments can also help to gain more insight into both long-term effects of 
particular interventions in terms of labour market outcomes and the costs, provided sufficient 
data can be collected. This knowledge may help governments decide which interventions to 




   7 
1  Introduction 
Governments all over the world intervene substantially in education in terms of public support  
for educational institutions and students, and by means of extensive regulation of the schooling 
system. This paper reviews the main arguments for government interference with education, 
and discusses the effectiveness of the commonly used instruments. The two most often 
mentioned arguments are market failures and equity considerations. Spillovers from education 
have been identified in the theoretical literature as an important source of market failures, which 
may drive a wedge between the social and private rate of return on education. The empirical 
literature, however, is ambiguous about the existence of these externalities at current levels of 
policy efforts.  
 
Effectiveness of education policy instruments is generally measured in terms of their impact on  
enrolment levels (i.e. quantity of education) and student performance (i.e. the quality of 
education). These two broad measures are used to review commonly used policies at different 
stages of the education life cycle. Hereby we confine ourselves to studies with a rigorous 
evaluation design, that is, studies that make use of controlled or natural experiments in order to 
identify the causal effects of a particular intervention. In these studies, early childhood 
interventions consistently appear to be very effective.        
 
This paper serves as a background study of a broader research project carried out at the CPB 
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, called “Micro-macro”. This project aims to 
investigate how insights from studies at the micro level about human capital (of which 
education is a major component), research and development (R&D), and competition can be 
applied to a macroeconomic context, and more specifically, how these insights can be 
implemented in the large macroeconomic models used at the CPB to forecast economic 
developments. The main findings are presented in Canton et al. (2005).  
 
The proposed research strategy of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the rationale 
for public intervention in education. In particular, we review the empirical literature on 
spillovers from education. Further, this section sheds some light on equity motives. Section 3 
reviews the literature on the effectiveness of various education policy instruments. We focus on 
evaluation studies based on controlled and natural experiments. Section 4 concludes and 
presents some suggestions for further research.   8 
2  Rationale for policy intervention in education 
2.1  Introduction 
Various reasons for public intervention in education have been identified in the literature. The 
most important motivation for public intervention in education is the occurrence of market 
failures. The presence of market failures may lead to underinvestment in education, at least 
relative to the social optimum. Spillovers from education are often be seen as the most 
important market failure. These education externalities form the central issue of Section 2.2. We 
first briefly pay attention to three other types of market failures that have been identified in the 
literature as well: capital market constraints, insurance market imperfections, and imperfect 
information and transparency problems.
1    
Capital market constraints emerge because students may not be able to borrow money from 
private banks with their future human capital as collateral. Talented students may decide not to 
enrol in higher education because they cannot find sufficient possibilities to finance their 
education. This would implicate underinvestment in education relative to the social optimum. 
Public provision of loans (or grants) to students would be a solution to this type of market 
failure.
2 
Insurance market imperfections can be linked to asymmetric information: it is costly for 
insurance companies to observe behaviour of students, or their risk profile. This may trigger 
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection (cf. CPB, 2002). 
Imperfect information and transparency problems arise when it is difficult for students to 
observe the quality of educational programs before they choose in which institution to enrol. 
Moreover, part of the quality of educational programs may remain unobserved by students and 
their future employers during their study or after completion (cf. CPB and CHEPS, 2001). This 
may lead to a situation in which students pay tuition fees for studies of insufficient quality. 
We would like to emphasise that the three market failures discussed above are most often 
mentioned in the context of tertiary (i.e. higher) education in particular. This relates to the fact 
that, in a great number of countries, students enrolled in tertiary education need to finance part 
of the costs of their education themselves. In contrast, primary education and - to a smaller 
extent - secondary education are generally completely financed by public means, so that these 
types of market failures are (to a large degree) already overcome. 
 
 
1 The reader is referred to CPB and CHEPS (2001) for a more elaborate discussion of these three market failures in the 
context of higher education and their relevance for government policy.  
2 An illustration of an intervention that is designed to solve capital market constraints is the public loan system with income-
contingent repayments after graduation that was introduced in Australia’s higher education sector in 1989. The interested 
reader is referred to CPB and CHEPS (2001) for a more detailed description of this program.      9 
Aside from market failures, other reasons for government intervention have been mentioned in 
the literature, such as equity (i.e. income distributional) considerations, paternalistic motives,
3 
and fiscal considerations
4. The equity argument will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.3.    
2.2  Education spillovers 
The idea of education externalities is that the benefits of individually acquired education may 
not be restricted to the individual, but might spill over to others as well (e.g. the public). The 
economic relevance of external effects of education lies in the fact that these spillovers may 
drive a wedge between the social return and the private return to education.  
Aside from education externalities, the literature (e.g. Temple, 2001) also mentions some 
other factors that may drive a wedge between the social and private return to education. For 
example, education may lead to more efficient matching between workers and jobs in labour 
markets, so that the social return may become higher than the private return. On the other hand, 
signalling
5 (also called screening), and rent-seeking activities
6 serve as explanations why the 
private return may exceed the social return to education.  
Evaluation of the optimal level of social (i.e. private plus public) investment in education and 
the optimal public-private balance in financing education requires a comprehensive assessment 
of all returns to schooling, both market and non-market effects (cf. Wolfe and Haveman, 2002). 
Table 2.1 presents an overview of the main effects of education. These effects have been 
classified into private effects and non-private effects. Private effects of education are effects 
that are reaped by the individuals receiving education themselves, whereas non-private effects 
are defined as effects that accrue to others. Non-private effects can be further decomposed into 
effects on the government budget, effects on income inequality, and external effects.
7 Within all 
 
3 Paternalism refers to the situation that people do not know exactly what is best for themselves; the government knows 
better, and considers education to be a merit good.    
4 It has been argued that education subsidies are an important instrument to reduce the negative incentives for the decision 
to invest in education that follow from a progressive tax system. This would implicate that education subsidies improve the 
trade-off between equity and efficiency, because the fiscal distortion on the schooling decision is reduced. Following this line 
of reasoning, education subsidies enable governments to impose more progressive taxes (cf. Bovenberg and Jacobs, 2001).    
5 Models of signalling start from the observation that individuals have characteristics that employers value but do not 
observe at the time of hiring (ability, determination, and so on). If there is a systematic association between these traits and 
the costs and benefits of education, this may lead to an equilibrium in which high-ability individuals stay in school longer 
because this decision signals their ability to employers. Stated otherwise, if educational attainment indeed acts as a 
screening device, there is a risk that further expansion of learning opportunities would simply increase the supply of 
credentials and produce only limited social returns. The signalling argument provides a plausible reason for a correlation 
between ability and years of schooling, and suggests that earnings may be correlated with educational attainment even if 
educational attainment has no effect on productivity (Temple, 2001).  
6 Rent-seeking activities do occur when differences in wage levels do not properly reflect differences in labour productivity 
(on a competitive market, gross salary is equal to labour productivity). For instance, it could be that highly educated workers 
have better access to jobs in which they appropriate part of profits earned in markets under imperfect competition.  
7 External effects and effects on income inequality are two important arguments for (more) government intervention in 
education. Income-distributional effects form the central issue of Section 2.3.    10 
categories, we distinguish among costs and benefits, if existent. We now briefly discuss each 
category in term.   
 
2.2.1  Private effects 
Financial effects 
Private effects of education can be classified into private financial and private non-financial 
effects.
8 Private financial returns have been subject of considerable analysis and measurement 
over recent decades. Most widely studied is the impact of educational attainment on an 
individual’s market productivity and thereby on gross earnings. This impact is generally found 
to be positive, even after having controlled for the correlation between characteristics such as 
innate ability, determination/motivation and family background on the one hand, and 
educational attainment on the other hand.
9 Temple (2001) has reviewed the international 
literature and concludes that estimates of the private rate of return to a year’s extra schooling 
typically lie somewhere between 5% and 15%.
10  
Several explanations can be given for this variety in estimates of the private rate of return to 
education. First, it is important to notice that the size of the private return to education may vary 
over different levels of education. For instance, it is found that the private rate of return to upper 
secondary education is slightly higher than to tertiary education (cf. OECD, 1998).
11 Second, 
estimates differ because of differences in study scope (e.g. countries under study) and time 
period under study. Third, the assumptions (e.g. on the size of the opportunity cost of 
education) and statistical methods (e.g. instrumental variables (IV) or ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimates) used often vary.
12  
 
Aside from the much-studied effects of education on productivity and hence earnings, other 
private financial effects have been identified in the literature. Higher non-wage labour market 
remuneration (e.g. fringe benefits) has been mentioned in the category of private benefits (cf. 
Wolfe and Haveman, 2002). Higher income tax payments (due to higher earnings) and direct 
 
8 Financial effects may also be interpreted as effects that are valued on a market.  
9 Studies omitting these important variables that are correlated with both schooling and earnings tend to overestimate the 
real impact of schooling on productivity and earnings. Omitting innate ability yields so-called ability bias.  
10 Temple states that there are some studies that have not detected an effect of education on productivity at all, but argues 
that there are some convincing reasons (e.g. measurement error, incorrect specification) to doubt such results.  
11 A study carried out by the OECD in 1997 on the basis of data for 1995 finds that the private annual rate of return for men 
in The Netherlands lies at 14.1% for upper secondary education versus 10.8% for university education (OECD, 1998). It 
appears that the higher wage premium associated with tertiary education is offset by higher costs incurred with this 
education level.  
12 A discussion of the empirical findings of the private (labour) market returns to education lies beyond the scope of this 
paper. We refer to Card (1999), Temple (2001), Carneiro et al. (2001), and Carneiro (2002) for a thorough discussion of the 
different methods used to estimate private rates of return (e.g. through natural experiments) and their implications for the 
results. Further, these papers also present some cautions against treating these estimates as precise estimates, following 
from considerations of heterogeneity (in terms of different rates of return for different social groups or fields of study), 
causality, ability bias and measurement error.    11 
costs of education (e.g. tuition fees; study materials; forgone earnings during the study period) 
can be seen as private financial costs of education (cf. OECD, 1998).  
Non-financial effects 
Private non-financial effects include benefits in terms of a better personal health position or 
increased personal satisfaction. There is considerable evidence (e.g. Grossman and Kaestner, 
1997; Wolfe and Zuvekas, 1997) showing that persons with higher levels of educational 
attainment tend to have better health than those with lower levels.
13 This relationship appears to 
hold even when controlling for the effects of education on increased earnings, hence money 
available to spend on health care and the likelihood of having employer-provided benefits. 
Hartog and Oosterbeek (1997) have controlled for the effect of a person’s IQ on its health 
situation in a study for the Netherlands, and find that particularly university education raises the 
chance of a good health status.   
2.2.2  Non-private effects 
Government budget 
Regarding positive effects of education on the government budget, we mention two items.  
First, the government can collect higher income taxes due to enhanced earnings. This is also 
called the ‘fiscal return to education’. Second, there is some tentative evidence that a more 
educated workforce is associated with a lower dependence - and hence lower public 
expenditures - on disability-related benefits or welfare (Wolfe & Haveman, 2002). Negative 




The traditional view is that education may contribute to a more equal income distribution. The 
recent literature, however, shows that the impact of education on income inequality is not 
unambiguous. Section 2.3 discusses the equity argument for public intervention in education 
into more detail.  
External effects 
Education externalities form an important efficiency argument for public intervention in 
education. The lower-right part of Table 2.1 gives an overview of the potential spillovers from 
 
13 McMahon (2001) explains this relationship by stating that more secondary education permits wider awareness of potential 
causes of illness, greater capacity to access information if illness occurs, entry into safer occupations, and secondary 
education also encourages adoption of healthier life styles. 
14 The marginal cost of public funds (MCPF) is higher than public expenditure on education, because we have to include the 
distorting effects of the tax collection needed to finance these public expenditures. A reasonable estimate for the MCPF 
would be 1.25 (cf. Lattimore, 1997). This means that 1 euro public expenditure would cost 1.25 euro in a welfare 
perspective.   12 
education, following the relevant literature.
15 The relevant question is whether there is any 
empirical evidence for the presence of positive externalities of education, and if so, how large  
these spillovers are. Stated otherwise, at given levels of education policy efforts, do social 
returns to education exceed private returns, and if so, by how much?   
Based on reviews of the recent literature on human capital spillovers by Venniker (2000), 
Temple (2001), and CPB and CHEPS (2001) (on tertiary education in particular), we can draw 
the following conclusions. First, empirical evidence is rather scarce. Second, the economic 
literature is ambiguous about the existence of human capital externalities at current levels of 
policy efforts, delivering some indications for positive externalities, but not very strong and 
undisputed. Examples of studies finding that private and social returns to education are roughly 
the same are Gemmel (1997), Blundell et al. (1999), Ciccone and Peri (2000), and Acemoglu 
and Angrist (2001).  
It may be useful, however, to distinguish among different types of externalities. Along the lines 
of Venniker (2000), we distinguish among static, dynamic and non-pecuniary externalities. 
Traditionally, the majority of literature on education externalities has focused on static 
externalities.  
Static human capital externalities 
The idea behind static human capital externalities is that an individual’s human capital raises 
the productivity of other factors of production, like physical capital and the human capital of 
others, through channels that are not internalised by individual families or firms (Lucas, 1988). 
In this context, Lucas states that the human interaction within cities is a prominent channel. 
There is some recent work carried out by Moretti (2004a; 2004b) arguing that education 
spillovers at the city level are indeed significant. Moretti uses city demographic structures and 
geographical presence of colleges to estimate education externalities, and finds significant 
effects of (growth in) the number of college graduates on wages (Moretti, 2004a) and 
productivity (Moretti, 2004b) of workers in the city, particularly workers with lower schooling 
levels.
16 
Another prominent paper by Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) finds conflicting results. 
Acemoglu and Angrist regress wages on schooling and on average schooling in state of 
 
15 The list of externalities presented in Table 2.1 is not an exhaustive list of all the potential education externalities. For a 
more comprehensive overview of externalities to education, we refer to Wolfe and Haveman (2002).  
16 For instance, Moretti (2004a) finds that a percentage point increase in the supply of college graduates raises high school 
drop-outs’ wages by 1.9%, high school graduates’ wages by 1.6%, and college graduates wages by 0.4%. However, it has 
been argued that Moretti’s theoretical framework cannot be used to estimate the strength of education externalities, because 
he ignores aggregate scale effects and does not control for the supply of other, possibly complementary, types of workers 
(Ciccone and Peri, 2002).     13 
residence.
17 They instrument individual schooling with quarter of birth and average schooling 
with compulsory schooling laws, and find that education externalities in terms of higher wages 
are small and statistically insignificant in the US. 
Another frequently used method to explore the existence of human capital spillovers in 
production is to compare cross-country macro-Mincer regressions (i.e. log GDP per capita 
versus log average years of schooling) with cross-individual micro-Mincer regressions (i.e. log 
wages versus log years of schooling). The difference between the macro-coefficient and the 
micro-coefficient would indicate the size of the (static) human capital externality.
18 This 
method makes it possible to capture nationwide externalities of education. It should be noted, 
however, that reverse causality (i.e. from GDP per capita to average educational attainment), 
measurement errors, and omitted variables may create problems at the country level of analysis, 
as pointed out by Krueger and Lindahl (2001). These problems may provide an important 
explanation for the fact that estimates of social returns to education based on this method vary 
widely. All in all, we may conclude that empirical evidence for significant static human capital 
spillovers is inconclusive. 
Dynamic externalities 
The following two externalities have been identified in he literature as belonging to the category 
of dynamic externalities to education. First, learning-by-doing (i.e. ‘learning-to-learn’) is more 
effective with higher average human capital. Second, as emphasised by Nelson and Phelps 
(1966) and Romer (1990), creating and adopting new technologies is more effective at higher 
levels of human capital. This implicates that schooling may lead to technological progress, and 
thereby to higher economic growth.
19 A couple of cautious remarks are in place here. First, the 
externality relates solely to (overall) technological progress not captured in the private return to 
education. Second, as noted by Krueger and Lindahl (2001), this externality is more likely to 
occur if human capital is expanded at higher levels of education. Finally, the direction of 
causality, running from education to economic growth (via technological progress), is not 
undisputed in the literature.  
 
17 Acemoglu and Angrist use US states as the geographical area, whereas Moretti uses US cities as the relevant 
community. Another difference is that Acemoglu and Angrist, by using child labor and compulsory schooling laws as 
instruments, focus on the effect on educational attainment in the lower part of the distribution, mostly in the middle school or 
high school. Moretti, on the other hand, identifies spillovers using variation in the number of college graduates, i.e. the upper 
part of the distribution. According to Moretti, there is no theoretical reason to expect that a one year increase in a city 
average education obtained by a rise in the number of those who finish high-school has the same effect as a similar 
increase in average education obtained by a rise in the number of those who graduate from college. 
18 The study of Heckman and Klenow (1998) provides an illustration of this method. After controlling for technology 
differences among countries, they find that the macro-coefficients are roughly in line with micro-estimates, indicating that 
there is no strong case for education externalities in production.  
19 An elaborate discussion of the literature on the relationship between human capital, technical change and economic 
growth lies beyond the scope of this paper. The interested reader is referred to Canton et al. (2005).     14 
Non-pecuniary externalities 
Much attention has been given in the literature to static and dynamic education spillovers, 
which can be characterised as direct economic benefits of education, in the sense of being 
related to performance at work. However, it should not be neglected that the creation of 
knowledge, skills and aptitudes through education affects social behaviour as well, which in 
turn may have important indirect economic effects. Wolfe and Haveman (2002) present an 
extensive list of these so-called non-pecuniary externalities of schooling, whereby they 
distinguish among intra-family externalities and externalities that accrue to others in society.
20 
Within the former category, which encompasses intergenerational effects, they mention the 
following impact channels: intra-family productivity,
21 child education
22 and cognitive 
development, infant health
23 and daughters’ fertility. The latter category, among others, 
encompasses positive externalities in the form of reduced crime, better public health situation 
and greater social cohesion.  
Evidence for the existence of positive non-pecuniary externalities seems most conclusive in 
the domain of crime reduction and improvements in health. For instance, Lochner and Moretti 
(2004) find that schooling significantly reduces the probability of incarceration and arrest in the 
US, especially for Afro-Americans. They estimate that the social savings from crime reduction 
associated with high school completion for men amount to around one fifth of the private 
return. Raising educational attainment, for instance by means of a reduction of the rate of early 
school dropouts, may therefore help to avoid crime and anti-social behaviour amongst young 
people.  
 
It should be stressed that non-pecuniary externalities are not incorporated in standard 
estimations of the social return to education, which typically measure effects on GDP and not 
on welfare. This would imply that, provided non-pecuniary externalities are prevalent, current 
estimates give an underestimation the true social returns to education, which in turn means that 
there could still be room for more government intervention in education. The magnitude of this 
downward bias is unclear, however, since we are unaware of any attempts to incorporate these 
non-pecuniary spillovers in any econometric analysis of the social returns to education.     
 
20 Prior studies that also try to assess the social effects of schooling are Haveman and Wolfe (1984), Wolfe and Zuvekas 
(1997), Behrman and Stacey (1997) and McMahon (2001).  
21 Wolfe and Haveman (2002) refer to some studies finding a positive relationship between own schooling and spouse’s 
health and mortality.     
22 For instance, a recent paper by Oreopoulos et al. (2003) investigates the causality of the relationship between parents’ 
education and child’s educational performance. Their results indicate that a one-year increase in the education of either 
parent reduces the probability that a child repeats a grade by between two and seven percentage points. Among 15 to 16 
year olds living at home, they also estimate that parental compulsory schooling significantly lowers the likelihood of dropping 
out. 
23 Currie and Moretti (2003), for example, find that higher maternal education improves infant health, as measured by birth 
weight and gestational age. It also increases use of prenatal care and reduces smoking, suggesting that these may be 
important pathways for the ultimate effect on infant health.   15 
Table 2.1  Overview of outcomes of education 
     
  Private  Non-private 





·  gross earnings   
·  non-wage labour market remuneration
1 
·  quality of employment
2  
costs: 
·  direct costs of education
3 
·  opportunity costs of education  




·  personal satisfaction 















·  income taxes collected by the government  
·  lower public transfers (e.g. disability-related 
benefits or welfare)  
costs: 




·  static externalities 
·  productivity of physical capital 
·  productivity of human capital of others
4 
·  dynamic externalities  
·  effectiveness of learning-by-doing  
·  technological progress  
·  non-pecuniary externalities 
·  physical and mental health of others  
·  crime reduction 
·  public participation
5 
·  political participation
6 
·  child quality
7 
·  intra-family productivity 
 
income inequality 
effect not unambiguous 
 
 
Sources: OECD (1998); McMahon (2001); Venniker (2000); Temple (2001); Krueger and Lindahl (2001); Wolfe and Haveman (2002).  
Notes: 
1 Wolfe and Haveman (2002) refer to some studies finding a positive relationship between the level of education and non-wage labour 
market remuneration (e.g. fringe benefits and working conditions). 
2 Mincer (1993) finds that educated workers have greater upward mobility in income and greater employment stability. 
3 One can think of tuition fees and study materials.  
4 This occurs for instance when skilled workers use their education to devise improved production methods for less skilled workers (CPB 
and CHEPS, 2001). 
5 This externality is also referred to as social cohesion or better citizenship. 
6 Similarly, Krueger & Lindahl (2001) state that education (particularly at lower levels) may lead to more informed political decisions, 
whereas McMahon (2001) empirically finds a positive relationship between lagged secondary education enrolment rates and 
democratization. Milligan et al. (2004) review the relationship between educational attainment and political involvement in the US and the 
UK. 
7 Wolfe & Haveman (2002) identify a positive impact of parents’ education on the child’s level of education and cognitive development, 
health situation and on fertility (e.g. lower probability that daughters will give birth out of wedlock as teens).    16 
Cautions 
Finally, we would like to point out some cautious remarks that are important in any analysis of 
education spillovers: 
·  As pointed out by Acemoglu (2002b) in his discussion of the paper of Wolve and Haveman 
(2002), a theoretical framework is needed that distinguishes effects affecting society as a whole, 
and thus can be properly called externalities, from effects of education that are already 
internalised by economic actors. Acemoglu stresses that many of the (non-market) effects of 
education presented in the literature may indeed be present in reality (and their magnitude is 
still useful to know), but may not correspond to any type of externality.
24 It is only externalities 
that governments should care about in the sense that these effects may provide a motivation to 
intervene in education. 
·  Another important issue that is brought up by Acemoglu (2002b) is that existing correlations in 
the data are frequently taken as the causal effect of education, for instance in the paper of 
Wolve and Haveman (2002). For example, he refers to the observed correlation between an 
individual’s level of education and the quality of all kinds of social choices like fertility and 
consumption choices. Acemoglu states that it is likely that other factors (e.g. innate ability, 
parental and social background) - other than educational attainment - impact on the social 
choices made. A more general implication of this is that we should be aware of ability bias in 
estimates of external effects of education. 
·  The majority of empirical research on education spillovers focuses on the US. Further research 
on the existence and magnitudes of education externalities needs to be undertaken in other 
countries as well. It may well be that the size of these spillovers varies widely over countries, 
corresponding to differences in educational systems, or levels of development. 
·  We have presented an overview of potential external benefits of education in general. It is 
important for governments to realise, however, that the scale on which certain education 
spillovers can be reaped may differ across education levels and types, as well as across socio-
economic groups.
25 This observation has important implications for governments’ allocation 
decisions of the education budget over different levels and types of education. Considering 
differences in magnitudes of externalities over different education levels, for example, it has 
been suggested that technology spillovers may be reaped though investments in tertiary 
education (and technical education in particular), whereas a reduction in crime levels or a lower 
 
24 Acemoglu (2002b) puts forward the example of education leading to more efficient consumer choices. When making 
education choices, assuming rationality, consumers take into account that not only they will earn more in the future, but also 
that they will be able to get greater purchasing power from these wages because of better consumer choices. In this case, 
there is no reason for the government to intervene, since this non-market effect is already internalised. 
25 Considering the degree to which externalities can be reaped across different socio-economic groups, Krueger and Lindahl 
(2001) refer to some research papers on the US suggesting that positive externalities (e.g. in the form of reduced crime or 
welfare participation) are more likely to be reaped from investments in children from disadvantaged families than for those 
from advantaged families.    17 
dependence on welfare is often attributed to secondary education, and improvements in public 
health can be assigned to primary education in particular.  
·  When we would observe that the social rate of return equals the private rate of return of 
education in a particular country with a particular level of public intervention, this does not 
necessarily imply that externalities are absent; existing subsidies to education may have 
completely internalised these education externalities, and in that case may have eliminated the 
gap between social and private rates of return that would have prevailed in the absence of these 
subsidies.
26 The existing level op policy efforts is optimal from an efficiency perspective in that 
case.
27   
 
2.3  Equity motives 
The two most important motives for public intervention in education from an economic point of 
view are to promote efficiency and equity. Whereas efficiency motives in the form of spillovers 
have been dealt with extensively in Section 2.2, here we will focus on the potential effects of 




Tinbergen (1975) and Teulings (2000) argue that there is a role for governments in reducing 
wage inequality by means of education subsidies. The central idea is that education policies, if 
effective in raising the average number of years of education (or in increasing enrolment at 
higher levels of education), will make low-skilled workers scarcer, raising their wages, while at 
the same time increasing the supply of highly educated workers and reducing their wages. In 
other words, the higher relative supply of skilled workers resulting from education policy will 




26 Similarly, when we would observe that the social rate of return is lower than the private of return to education, positive 
externalities to education could still be in place, notably in the case when subsidies are too generous on efficiency grounds.  
27 However, obtaining good estimates of the private rate of return, and - even more so - of the social rate of return of 
education is not an easy task. Consequently, caution is required if one is to draw conclusions on the optimal scale of 
government intervention in education (i.e. if one is to answer the question if and by how much the current level of subsidies 
to education should be expanded or reduced).    
28 The idea is that (part of)  the inequality in earnings can be attributed to differences in educational attainment between 
people. However, inequality in earnings may also be present among persons that have enjoyed the same number of years 
of education, resulting in part from differences in individual characteristics or differences in educational quality. Consider for 
instance the US, where in some states, the amount of public financing of schools offering primary education is based on the 
amount of tax revenues from local real estate taxes, thereby creating large inequalities in the education system, which 
explains part of the inequality in earnings. Therefore, both earnings gaps by education level (high educated versus low 
educated) as well as quality differences must be considered when analysing the impact of education on income inequality. 
29 This way, the private return to education (i.e. the return to skills) can be interpreted as a measure of the degree of income 
inequality across groups of workers with different levels of educational attainment. By definition, this indicator abstracts from 
income differences among persons having enjoyed the same number of years of education, because the private return to 
education is estimated as an average rate of return for all people having attained a certain educational level.    18 
Is there any evidence that supports this mechanism? Dur and Teulings (2001) refer to several 
studies carried out for a number of countries showing that an increase in (average) educational 
attainment corresponds to a lower level of wage inequality. Furthermore, the results of a cross-
country study by Teulings and Van Rens (2003) show that the private return of education falls 
by 1.5 percentage points when the average education level of the population increases by a year, 
which again would imply a reduction in wage inequality between groups with different 
educational attainment. These results seem to suggest that education policy may be used to 
reduce wage inequality, at least when it succeeds in raising average educational attainment of 
the population. However, the literature also mentions some reasons why education policy may 
not be effective in lowering wage inequality. A comprehensive overview of these factors is 
presented by Jacobs (2004). Here, we will confine ourselves to a brief discussion of two of the 
most eminent explanations.  
 
First, some endogenous growth theories identify a positive relationship between the supply of 
skilled workers and the rate of so-called skill-biased technological change. It is assumed that an 
increase in the stock of skilled workers induces the development of new technologies that are 
more complementary to skilled workers.
30 Consequently, stimulating skill formation with 
education subsidies will not only increase relative supply of skilled workers, but also relative 
demand for skilled workers. The tendency for relative wages of skilled workers (i.e. the so-
called ‘skill premium’) to fall is countered. This effect may be so strong that the skill premium 
even rises in the long run. Wage inequality may therefore increase rather than decrease in the 
wake of growth in the relative supply of skilled workers, which is demonstrated by Acemoglu 
(1998; 2002a)
31 and Nahuis and Smulders (2002)
32, among others.  
The recent growth of the skill premium observed in some developed countries (particularly 
in the UK and US) can thus be explained by factors of demand that compensate for the growth 
in the supply of skills during the past decades. Opinions differ however, on the causes of this 
hike in relative demand for skilled workers. Whereas Acemoglu, as explained above, holds 
 
30 Endogenous growth models (e.g. Acemoglu, 2002a) argue that the development of technology is, at least in part, a 
response to profit incentives, and not so much stemming from coincidental (exogenous) advances in science. It is argued 
that a larger supply of skilled workers makes developing skill-biased techniques more profitable, because in that case there 
are more workers (i.e. greater market size) to use these technologies under increasing returns to scale (due to the presence 
of fixed costs of innovation and vacancies). Therefore, new techniques tend to become more and more skill-biased when the 
supply of skills in the economy grows.   
31 Acemoglu (2002a) states that the behaviour of wages and returns to schooling in the US indicates that technical change 
has been skill-biased during the past sixty years. Further, he concludes that the evidence points to an acceleration in skill-
biased technical change during the past few decades, which is explained by the rapid increase in the supply of skills during 
this period. 
32 Nahuis and Smulders (2002) argue that skilled workers produce knowledge that affects the firm’s productivity directly by 
reducing current production costs, as well as indirectly by reducing the cost of future R&D. Hence an increase in the supply 
of skilled workers would ultimately lead to an increase in the wages of these educated workers, provided that (1) the degree 
of appropriability of investment in knowledge capital is sufficiently large, (2) the investment costs do not rise too quickly, and 
(3) diminishing returns related to knowledge accumulation do not set in too strongly.    19 
endogenous skill-biased technological change responsible for the observed increases in relative 
demand for skilled workers, others (e.g. Autor et al., 1998; Dur and Teulings, 2001; 
Oosterbeek, 2001) have pointed at rather coincidental (i.e. exogenous) advances in information 
technology (e.g. the emergence of the microchip, the personal computer and internet). This 
would explain the rise in the skill premium and thereby the higher income disparities observed 
between groups of skilled and unskilled workers.
33  
Let us present an illustration of how forces of demand and supply for skilled workers have 
evolved differently across the US and the Netherlands, as witnessed by differences in the trends 
in skill premiums. It has been observed that the (Mincer) return to education, and consequently 
income disparity between skilled and unskilled workers, has witnessed a steep rise in the US 
(see Acemoglu, 2002a) during the 1980s. In the Netherlands, however, the return to education 
remained more or less stable during this period.
34 Oosterbeek (2001) argues that, whereas both 
countries witnessed a hike in demand for skilled workers (due to skill-biased technical change 
and changes in international trade patterns, which are assumed to operate in both countries), 
supply of skilled workers has grown relatively faster in the Netherlands than in the US during 
the 1980s. According to Oosterbeek, this is mainly due to the large increase in participation of 
women with higher levels of education, as well as in higher segments of the labour market. 
 
A second reason why education policy may not succeed in reducing income inequality follows 
from the fact that subsidies on education are not equally distributed. For instance, it is found 
that the 50% richest households receive about 80% of education subsidies in the Netherlands 
(SCP, 1994).
35 This may offset the reduction in inequality from changes in relative wages 
between skilled and unskilled workers. Thus, on the one hand, inequality increases, because 
these education subsidies turn out to be regressive, whereas on the other hand, education 
subsidies might compress wage differentials (because of their effect on the relative supply of 
 
33 However, there is some discussion in the literature whether the effects of information technology on (relative) demand for 
skilled workers are indeed that large. See for example Borghans and Ter Weel (2001), who notice that, although the 
implementation of computers has improved the position of more-skilled workers, there are several other findings that are 
inconsistent with the interpretation that computer use requires skills. For example, it is mentioned that while high-skilled 
workers use computers more frequently, a substantial fraction of low-skilled workers use computers as well. Furthermore, 
Acemoglu (2002a) argues that, despite the observed acceleration in skill bias, the recent advances in information technology 
do not imply that we are in the midst of a ‘technological revolution’; what has changed is not necessarily the overall rate of 
progress, but the types of technologies that are being developed (notably, skill-biased technologies).  
34 The Mincer return to education in the Netherlands declined from 11% in 1962 to 5% in 1985 (Hartog et al., 1993), after 
which it remained more or less stable until 1996, as shown by Hartog et al. (1999). Recent research based on new data 
shows that the return to education has risen sharply after the mid-1990s, notably from 6% in 1994 to 8.5% in 1999 (Leuven 
and Oosterbeek, 2000).  
35 Moreover, it has been observed that the distribution of public expenditures on higher education is even more unequal in 
the Netherlands; SCP (2003) shows that the 20% richest households receive more than 40% of public expenditures on full-
time education for students above 18 years (excluding student grants), which encompasses mostly university education and 
higher vocational training, whereas the 40% poorest households receive a little more than 15% of these expenditures. This 
relatively more unequal distribution can be explained by higher enrolment levels at post-compulsory schooling by richer 
income groups, as well as by the fact that this higher enrolment covers more expensive forms of education (particularly 
university education).    20 
skilled workers) and thereby reduce inequality. Dur and Teulings (2001) show that the net 
effect of these two forces on income inequality is uncertain. They argue therefore that a strategy 
that focuses solely on raising enrolment rates in tertiary education will not be the most effective 
way to obtain a more equal income distribution. Instead, they suggest that education policy 
should be designated to either raising educational attainment at all levels of education, or a 
more selective growth of higher education by stimulating enrolment of students belonging to 
lower socio-economic groups.  
 
We refer to Jacobs (2004) for a more elaborate discussion of some other factors identified in the 
literature explaining why education policies designated to reduce income inequality may be 
counterproductive.
36 We can conclude that, apart from efficiency motives, equity considerations 
may provide an additional motivation for public intervention in education. However, it is 
doubtful whether education policy is an effective instrument to reduce wage inequality. Jacobs 
(2004) argues that more direct instruments in the form of progressive income taxes are better 
suited to reduce income inequality than indirect instruments such as education subsidies. 
 
36 For instance, Jacobs mentions that education subsidies may lose their potential to affect the income distribution under 
free trade, because wage rates of workers with the same skills will then tend to converge to levels that are determined on 
global, rather than local markets.     21 
3  Effectiveness of education policy 
3.1  Introduction 
How does policy affect education, and thereby the accumulation of human capital?
37 There are 
basically two channels through which education policy can operate: through educational 
quantity or through the impact on educational quality. Educational quantity is usually expressed 
in enrolment levels or average years of schooling. Educational quality has been traditionally 
measured by input measures such as teacher-student ratios, teachers’ human capital or total 
public expenditures on education. A more recent strategy, however, is to evaluate educational 
quality in terms of output indicators measuring the performance of students and graduates. 
Towards this end, test scores in areas like maths, reading and science are often used. The idea is 
that when students in one country outperform students in another, provided these students are in 
the same grade, we can assume that they have enjoyed schooling of higher quality, irrespective 
whether this higher quality comes from higher teacher-student ratios, the quality of teachers, 
other expenditures on education or other unobservable factors specific to the production of 
human capital.  
Several empirical studies find positive effects of (changes in) educational quantity (e.g. 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Krueger and Lindahl, 2001; Bassanini and Scarpetta, 2001), and 
educational quality (e.g. Hanushek and Kimko, 2000) on macroeconomic performance.
38 The 
apparent relationship between the state of an educational system and macroeconomic 
performance makes the question as to how policy affects the quantity and quality of education 
all the more relevant.  
3.2  Outcomes of evaluation studies  
Table 3.1 presents an overview of the outcomes of studies measuring the causal effect of 
various types of public interventions.
39 We distinguish among the effect on enrolment levels 
 
37 Though education is an important source of human capital formation, human capital is also accumulated in later stages of 
the life cycle, notably through work-related training, experience and learning-by-doing. Heckmann (2000) states that this 
post-school learning accounts for as much as one third to one half of all skill formation in a modern economy. However, it 
goes beyond the scope of this paper to discuss - the rationale for and effectiveness of - policy measures targeted at these 
other components of human capital formation. Moreover, the scope for public intervention in the market for (work-related) 
training is generally assumed to be more limited than in the market for education. 
38 However, the debate on the precise magnitude of these macroeconomic effects of education is far from settled, stemming 
from disputes on the choice of appropriate data sets (i.e. measurement problems) and econometric techniques. Moreover, 
the causality of the relationship between education and economic growth has even been challenged by some (cf. Bils and 
Klenow, 2000). The interested reader is referred to Canton et al. (2005) for an overview of the main findings of this growth-
empirics literature.  
39 The majority of evaluation studies presented in Table 3.1 applies to the US. It appears that sound evaluations of 
interventions carried out in other countries are rather scarce, at least those with an experimental or quasi-experimental 
design.    22 
(i.e. the quantity channel) and on measures of student performance (i.e. the quality channel).
40 
Besides categorising education policies according to their particular focus (i.e. quantity versus 
quality), we also subdivide educational interventions according to the different stages of the 
education career in which they are carried out. To this end, we distinguish among interventions 
during pre-compulsory schooling (or early childhood interventions), compulsory schooling (i.e. 
primary and secondary education), and post-compulsory schooling (i.e. tertiary education), as 
indicated in the first column of Table 3.1. Finally, in the presence of a government education 
budget constraint, policymakers should not only be concerned with the timing of educational 
interventions (i.e. when to intervene?), but also with the choice of a particular type of 
intervention (i.e. how to intervene?). Table 3.1 therefore reviews various types of interventions 
at each stage of the education cycle.  
 
How can the effects of a particular intervention best be measured? We argue that the majority of 
traditional evaluation studies is not able to identify the true causal effects of the education 
policies under study. The most important reason is the occurrence of so-called endogeneity bias 
(cf. Webbink, 2005). This endogeneity (or selection) bias takes place because there are often 
unobservable characteristics of educational inputs (e.g. students, schools), for instance innate 
ability or motivation, that are correlated with both the intervention and the performance 
indicator. An illustration of the occurrence of selection bias is if one is to evaluate the effects of 
a class-size reduction. Teachers often (deliberately) sort students into classes of different sizes 
according to assessments of their behaviour or intelligence, which makes the observed 
correlation between class size and student achievement hard to interpret. The ignorance of this 
selection bias can lead to seriously misleading conclusions on the effects of a reduction in class 
size.  
This problem is tackled in evaluation studies with an experimental or quasi-experimental 
design, at least if the research design is set up properly. Experimental designs are based on 
controlled experiments in which the selection into treatment and control groups is determined 
completely at random, for instance by means of a lottery. Quasi-experimental research designs 
are based on so-called natural experiments that follow from naturally occurring circumstances 
or institutional rules that select students (or schools) into treatment and control groups in a 
manner akin to purposeful random assignment (cf. Angrist, 2003).
41 Comparing the relevant 
outcomes (i.e. student performance and enrolment) for the treatment group with those of the 
 
40 The interested reader is referred to Webbink (2005) and Webbink and Hassink (2002) for a more elaborate analysis of the 
particular outcomes of these evaluation studies.  
41 A nice example of a natural experiment can be found in the study of Leuven et al. (2004b) that assesses the effectiveness 
of extra funds for teachers on student achievement in the Netherlands. Schools with at least 70 percent minority students 
received additional funds destined for extra personnel. This cut-off at 70 percent provides a natural experiment based on a 
so-called regression discontinuity design. The causal effect of the program can be identified by comparing student 
achievement in schools just above the cut-off (i.e. the treatment group) with schools just below the cut-off (i.e. the control 
group).    23 
control group will yield the causal effects of a certain intervention. Table 3.1 encompasses only 
those studies that make use of such rigorous methodological designs, that is, including control 
groups and random assignment. An important implication of this selection criterion is that our 
overview does not cover the whole spectrum of interventions that are currently carried out, 
because some interventions may be less suitable for (quasi-) experimental evaluations than 
others. We are aware of the fact that other types of evaluations exist, but we are not able to 
judge their relevance, since a counterfactual is lacking. Let us discuss the main findings from 
the (quasi-) experimental evaluation literature.   
Quantity versus quality: focus on quality 
It appears from Table 3.1 that the vast majority of interventions are designed to affect 
educational quality, which can be explained as follows. It could well be that some interventions 
of which the impact is reported solely on educational quality may indeed have affected (or were 
designed to impact upon) educational quantity as well, but that this impact was not studied. A 
more profound reason is that the studies in Table 3.1 evaluate the effectiveness of interventions 
carried out in advanced economies only (most of them in the US), and not in developing 
countries. Since advanced economies have often reached the upper limits of enrolment, at least 
in primary and - though somewhat less - in secondary education, recent public interventions in 
these countries have mainly focused on improving educational quality.
42 Stated otherwise, the 
scope for raising educational quantity (i.e. enrolment or average years of education) in 
developed countries is generally limited, at least when compared to developing countries. This 
is not to deny that there is still some potential to raise educational quantity in industrialized 
countries, for instance by raising enrolment in tertiary education or by lowering dropout rates in 
secondary education in particular. However, as argued by Sianesi and Van Reenen (2002), the 
incremental value of additional education in countries where average length of education is 
already high is less obvious, and probably largely depends on the type and quality of education.  
Timing of intervention: early childhood interventions effective 
Another important conclusion from Table 3.1 is that early childhood interventions appear to be 
unambiguously effective, both in terms of raising average years of education, as well as in 
improving student performance.
43 In contrast, the picture is mixed when looking at 
interventions in later stages of the education cycle (i.e. compulsory and post-compulsory 
schooling). 
 
42 In the Netherlands for instance, 92% of all people aged 16 were engaged in full-time education in the year 2000 (89% in 
1980), and that of 18-year olds amounted to 64% (46% in 1980), whereas enrolment of 24-year olds stood at 17% (9% in 
1980) (SCP, 2004).  
43 Another argument in favour of early interventions in education is that early investments raise the productivity of later 
investments, as argued by Carneiro and Heckman (2003): ‘Learning begets learning, skills (both cognitive and non-
cognitive) acquired early on facilitate later learning’. Further, it should be mentioned that the benefits of early childhood 
interventions seem to be larger for more disadvantaged children (cf. Currie, 2001).   24 
Heckman (2000) and Currie (2001) summarise the outcomes of several studies measuring the 
effects of a large number of early childhood intervention programs carried out in the US.
44 The 
most famous example of a thoroughly evaluated early childhood intervention is the large-scale 
Perry Preschool Program. Schweinhart, et al. (1993) show that even long-term effects of this 
program are positive, in terms of both higher employment and earnings, and a lower 
dependency on public assistance. Several other randomized evaluation studies of early 
childhood interventions also find positive effects.
45  
It is important, however, to realise that the lag between the early childhood intervention and 
labour market entrance of the targeted students is much longer than in the case of interventions 
during compulsory schooling or, even more obvious, during post-compulsory schooling. This 
means that the macroeconomic benefits of early childhood interventions, if any, materialise on a 
longer term as well.  
Type of intervention matters 
At each stage of the education cycle, the government can mostly choose from a large menu of 
interventions. The overview of the evaluation literature shows that the effectiveness of 
interventions differs across different types of interventions, particularly at the compulsory and 
post-compulsory stage of the education cycle. For example, extensions of instruction time 
appear to have a positive impact on student performance, whereas a larger availability of 
computer facilities inside the classroom or teacher training does not seem to have any 
significant positive impact at all. An important policy implication is that aside from timing, the 
choice of a particular type of intervention matters as well.  
However, the impact not only differs across different types of intervention, but also within 
certain classes of intervention. Examples of categories of interventions for which the evaluation 
literature shows mixed results are the introduction of smaller class sizes at the compulsory 
schooling level (three studies showing a positive impact on student performance, whereas two 
studies report no significant impact at all), and the implementation of performance incentives 
for students in post-compulsory education. Possible explanations for this mixed evidence are 






44 We have considered only those studies that use a random assignment (quasi-)experimental design to determine program 
impacts.  
45 Examples are Gray et al. (1983), Garber (1988), Johnson and Walker (1991), and Campbell et al. (2002).    25 
 Table 3.1  Effectiveness of public interventions in education by type and level (based on studies with an 
(quasi-) experimental approach)  
         
Timing (level)  Intervention (type) + country








       
  early childhood interventions       
  several pre-school intervention programs 
(e.g. full-day child care, home visits, pre-
school program) (US) 
Heckman (2000);Currie (2001)
5  +  +
16 
Compulsory
1         
  ‘classical’ education inputs       














  expenditure per pupil (US)  Guryan (2001)  n.s./+
9   






- various countries 
 
Angrist and Lavy (1999) 
Dobbelsteen et al. (2002) 
Krueger (1999, 2003) 
Hoxby (2000a) 
Krueger and Whitmore (2001) 










  teacher training/acquisition  
- Israel 
- US   
teacher testing/certification (US) 
 
Angrist and Lavy (2001) 
Jacob and Lefgren (2004a) 









  computer facilities 
- in elementary and middle schools (Israel) 
- in primary schools (NL) 
internet investment subsidy 
 
Angrist and Lavy (2002a) 
Leuven et al. (2004b) 






         
  organisational changes       
  school-going age extension (Sweden)  Meghir and Palme (1999)    + 






Cullen et al. (2003) 






  performance incentives
4  
- merit pay for teachers (Israel) 












  peer group (changes in class heterogeneity)  











teachers’ grading standards (US)  Figlio and Lucas (2000)  +   
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Table 3.1  Continued       
         
Timing (level)  Intervention (type) + country






         
  specific projects for students at risk 
- cash bonus for high school matriculation 
  for low-achieving students (Israel) 
- additional instruction to 
underperforming students (Israel) 
- funding for extra personnel for primary     
  schools with disadvantaged students 
- student counselling and financial 
   incentives for minority students (US) 
- several dropout prevention programs (US) 
- remedial summer education (US) 
 
Angrist and Lavy (2002b) 
 
Lavy and Schlosser (2004) 
 
Leuven et al. (2004b) 
 
Taggart (1995); Heckman 
(2000) 
Dynarski et al. (1998)
6 



























       





Heckman et al. (1998), 











  financial support (loans/ grants) 
- California college grant program (US) 
- social security student benefit (US)  













  performance incentives for students 
- reward for 1st year college completion(NL) 
- performance-based grant system (NL) 
 
Leuven et al. (2003) 








Sources: partly adapted from Webbink and Hassink (2002); Webbink (2005). 
1 Primary and secondary education. 
2 Tertiary education. 
3 US = United States, NL =Netherlands. 
4 The reader is referred to Canton and Webbink (2004) for a discussion of evaluations of interventions based on performance incentives. 
5 Heckman and Currie have reviewed several (quasi-)experimental evaluation studies of various early childhood intervention schemes.   
6 Dynarski et al. (1998) have reviewed sixteen dropout prevention programs carried out in the US, of which eight middle-school programs 
and eight high-school programs. These programs were generally ineffective in lowering the dropout rate or improving student performance. 
However, some positive results were found for a limited number of intensive middle school programs and for high school GED programs. 
7 + significant positive effect on performance; n.s. no effect; - significant negative effect on performance. 
8 Positive effects on test scores apply only to pupils with lower educated parents and minority children. 
9 Test scores are positively affected for 4th-grade students, but increased spending showed no effect on 8th-grade test scores  
10 Class-size effects are estimated on mathematics and science achievement in 18 countries. Significant positive effects of smaller class 
size were found for only two countries (Iceland and Greece). Wöβmann and West (2005) conclude that class-size effects in one school 
system cannot be interpreted as a general finding for all school systems. 
11 Positive effects are found for secular schools, but effects on student performance in religious schools are insignificant. 
12 Effects have been studied on teacher quality as an indirect measure of educational quality.  
13 Remedial education improved the performance of sixth graders, but not of third graders. 
14 Cash bonuses for high school matriculation (this is a prerequisite for university admission) are effective when provided to an entire 
school, but not when given to individually selected students within the school. 
15 Positive effects are found for students with high math skills and for students with higher educated fathers when given a ‘high’ reward.  
16 The quantity effect of early childhood interventions refers to the direct effect on average years of schooling due to the extra classes in 
the pre-school stage, but also to the indirect effect caused by increased high school graduation rates and/or lower dropout rates.  
17 The quantity effect refers to the impact on the dropout rate.  
18 Presented numbers are enrolment elasticities.    27 
3.3  A note of caution 
We have seen in Section 3.2 that studies based on natural experiments or controlled policy 
experiments, in which some (randomly assigned) schools or students are exposed to a certain 
treatment, and others not, may help governments to gain valuable insights in what works and 
what not.
46 Nonetheless, several reasons can be identified why we should be cautious drawing 
too firm conclusions on the (relative) effectiveness of particular interventions on the basis of the 
outcomes of these evaluation studies.  
First, the effectiveness of a particular intervention depends upon the (local) conditions under 
which the intervention is implemented, in terms of for instance the type and quality of 
education, or the demographics of the students targeted with it. Moreover, effects of similar 
interventions may differ due to differences in setup and management of the program in 
question. This implicates that effects found in one program need not occur when exactly the 
same program is implemented in another city, region, country or time period.  
Second, a cost-benefit analysis has not been carried out in most evaluation studies presented 
in Table 3.1. Some interventions may yield positive effects in terms of improvements in student 
performance or enrolment, but may not be cost-effective due to the large expenditures incurred 
in those programs. Moreover, as argued by Carneiro and Heckman (2003), for many large-scale 
interventions it is essential to account for general equilibrium effects that may reverse or 
diminish partial equilibrium effects. 
Third, comparing the effectiveness of particular interventions also requires to take into 
account the timing and duration of benefits. Table 3.1 only shows whether the impact of various 
education policies on educational quantity or quality is positive or not, but it is often unknown 
when effects start to materialise, or whether these effects are prolonged or not.  
Fourth, a full analysis of the effectiveness of a particular intervention calls for insight into 
the long-term effects, in terms of wage levels, labour productivity and chance of employment. 
Knowledge of these long-term effects is often lacking, since there is often a long lag between 
the intervention and labour market entrance of the students targeted with it.
47 This lag may 
range from a couple of years in case of interventions in higher education to more than a decade 
in case of pre-school interventions.  
 
46 However, there are a couple of objections to controlled experiments, such as problems of implementing random 
assignment correctly, ethical objections (some students are denied access to a potentially beneficial program), the often 
large costs involved (in setting up the experiment), and the fact that it may be difficult to generalise results from an 
experiment to the wider population. The reader is referred to Heckman and Smith (1995) for a more detailed discussion of 
the pros en cons of social experiments. 
47 The majority of evaluation studies of educational interventions has not assessed long-term effects, which is often due to a 
lack of data (in turn due to time and money constraints). A  clear exception can be found in the evaluation of the Perry 
Preschool Project by Schweinhart et al. (1993), who study the impact of this early childhood intervention on factors such as 
high school graduation rates, earnings, crime rates and welfare use, as of age 27.   28 
4  Conclusion and suggestions for further research 
In this paper we have reviewed arguments for government intervention in education, and 
discussed the effectiveness of commonly used policy instruments. The main policy implications 
are as follows: 
·  Evidence for significant positive spillovers from education, that is, social returns exceeding 
private returns, appears to be lacking, at current levels of policy efforts at least. This would 
imply that there is no rationale for more government intervention in education from an 
efficiency point of view. However, it should be mentioned that non-pecuniary spillovers are not 
incorporated in conventional measures of social returns to education. Indications of positive 
non-pecuniary spillovers are most profound in the areas of crime reduction and health situation; 
·  Securing a more equal income distribution through public support for education is often used as 
an important equity rationale for public interference with education. However, several 
(theoretical and empirical) factors have been identified in the literature as to why education 
policy may not lead to lower income inequality. An example of an important theoretical 
argument is endogenous skill-biased technological change;  
·  Early childhood interventions consistently appear to be very effective in terms of both higher 
educational attainment as well as improved student performance. Evidence on interventions in 
later stages of the education cycle (i.e. during compulsory and post-compulsory schooling) is 
much less unambiguous. This means that, aside from the timing of intervention, governments 
should also be concerned with the type of interventions they choose.  
 
The main challenges for further research are twofold. First, though not an easy task, it seems 
worthwhile to direct research more towards the identification and estimation of all kinds of non-
pecuniary spillovers, as they are not taken into account in conventional estimations of the social 
returns to education. Moreover, most estimates of social returns to education (relative to private 
returns) have been carried out for the US. This type of research should be extended to other 
countries as well, so that we can judge the case for more government intervention elsewhere. 
Second, we have seen that the number of studies that evaluate all kinds of educational 
interventions based on a rigorous (quasi-)experimental approach has increased rapidly during 
the last decade or so. However, this new experimental literature does not cover the whole 
spectrum of interventions. Moreover, effects of a particular program found in one country need 
not to occur in another country, which may be due to differences in educational systems for 
example. This calls for setting up more controlled experiments domestically. An alternative is 
to broaden the search for so-called natural experiments, that may arise from certain 
discontinuities in the distribution of educational resources for example. This will improve our 
understanding of which interventions work and which not.  29 
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